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CASENOTES
to show the maintenance of a liquor nuisance.'5 The probative value of
such evidence is to be determined in connection with all the other
evidence in the case, ' and, in the absence of a statute making possession
of a license prima facie evidence of guilt,'" the mere issuance of such a
license is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. 18
At the time the instant case was decided, there was a statute'9 which
made the purchase and possession of the gambling stamp prima facie
evidence of violation of the gambling laws. It is interesting to note that
this statute was not even mentioned in this case, although there was an
excellent opportunity to do so, and its logical application would have
resulted in an opposite decision. However, it is probable that the court
refrained from mentioning the statute in anticipation of the case,20 which
only a few months later, held the statute unconstitutional. Thus the
court appears to have followed the law with regard to liquor licenses.
JOAN M. F RANKS
CORPORATIONS-CUMULATIVE VOTING-STAGGER
SYSTEM-UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A stockholder sought to have declared unconstitutional an Illinois
statute' which provided that a corporation could stagger the terms of
office of its directors by designating different classes of directors who are
elected at different intervals. Held, that although the Illinois Constitution,
providing for cumulative voting, did not expressly prohibit director classifica-
tion, the statute could not be upheld since it defeated the purpose of
cumulative voting. Wolfson v. Avery, Illinois Supreme Court, No. 33563,
April 15, 1955.*
Cumulative voting is a method by which a stockholder, instead of
voting his shares for each of the directors to be elected, is allowed to cast
the whole number of his votes for one director or to concentrate or distribute
15. State v. Kallas, see note 14 supra.
16. Bishop v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. 410, 214 P.2d 971 (1950); White v. Comm.,
107 Va. 901, 59 S.E. 1101 (1907).
17. For example, ARK. STAT. § 48-49 (1947).
18. Appling v. State, 88 Ark. 393, 114 S.W. 927 (1908); Peyton v. State,
83 Ark. 102, 102 S.W. 1110 (1907); Liles v. State, 43 Ark. 95 (1884),
19. FLA. STAT. § 849.051 (1953).
20. Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1954)(held statute unconstitutional
on ground that mere possession of the stamp cannot be prima facie evidence that
defendant has been guilty of a crime when there is no evidence of any kind that a
crime has been committed).
1. ILL. CODE ANN. § 157.35 (1951): Providing that when a corporation shall
have nine or more directors they may be divided into classes.
2. ILL. CONST. ART. XI, sec. 3 (1870): Every stockholder shall have the right
to cumulate his vote. ILL. CODE. ANN. § 157.28 (1951).
*A rehearing of this case is anticipated.
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such votes as he sees fit.8 Under this system, the stockholder multiplies the
number of his shares by the number of directors to be elected. The
product represents the number of votes the stockholder may cast as he
pleases. The purpose of this device is to give a sufficient minority an
opportunity to secure representation on the board of directors.4 Cumulative
voting is a potent weapon against corporate mismanagement since the
minority directors can inform stockholders of misdealings.5  It makes
management by secrecy an impossibility.6  Those opposed to cumulative
voting have two major objections. First, it permits corporate raids by
minority stockholders.7  Second, it is detrimental to smooth and efficient
management.8
Generally speaking, there are three ways that the right to cumulative
voting in the election of directors is provided:
(I) Required by the state constitution. 9
(II) Required by a state statute. 10
(III) Optional, by state statute, if provided for in the corporate
charter.'1
If cumulative voting is required by constitutional or statutory provisions,
it can not be circumvented by contrary provisions in the corporate charter
or by-laws. 12 If it is permitted by statute, then the corporation charter or
by-laws must expressly provide for cumulative voting.'8 Florida has no
statutory or constitutional provisions governing cumulative voting in general
3. 13 Axi. JuR., Corporations, § 508: State statutes always provide for the
election of directors by stockholders. See the UNI'ofum Bus. CORP. ACT. § 31, which
provides that except as in the case of vacancies, directors other than those constituting
the first board shall be elected by the stockholders.
4. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, Cumulative Voting, § 2048 (1952).




9. ILL. CONST. ART. X1, § 3 (1870); PA. CONsT. ART. XVI, § 4 (1874); S. DAK.
CossT. ART. XVII, § 5 (1898).
10. CAL. LAW. OF CORP. C. 1, § 2235 (Deering 1947); 01o STAT. ANN. § 1701.58
(1951); WAsh. REv. CODE 23:32:070 (1951).
11. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 214 (1953); N. Y. LAws, c. 653, § 49 (1935); N.J.
REv. STAT. 14:10-15 (1937); GN. LAWS RI. c. 116, § 23 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 3744 (1942); VA. ConE § 13-203 (1950).
12. Wright v. Cent. Cal. Water Co. 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885); Chicago
Macaroni Co. v. Boggiano, 202 I11. 312, 67 N.E. 17 (1903); Zachary v. Milin, 294
Mich. 622, 293 N.W. 770 (1940); Commonwealth v. Green, 351 Pa. 170, 40 A.2d
492 (1945); State v. Perham, 30 Wash.2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948); Cross v. W. Va.
Cent. Ry. 35 W. Va. 174, 12 S.E. 1071 (1891).
13. Chappel v. Standard Supply Co. 15 Del. Ch. 333, 138 Atl. 74 (1927); In re
Brophy, 13 N.J. Misc. 462, 179 Ad. 128 (1935); In re American Fibre Seat Corp., 265
N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253 (1934); In re Jamaica Consumers' ice Co. 190 App. Div. 739,
180 N.Y. Supp. 384 (1920).
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business corporations,' 4 therefore, it is probably necessary to provide for
the right in the certificate of incorporation.15
Classification of directors is a device to counter the effect of cumulative
voting.1 Under this system, a corporation may place its directors into
classes who hold staggered terms, each class being elected at different
intervals. Many states 7 have statutes which permit this practice in
corporate business, if provided for in the charter. The result of its applica-
tion is tantamount to nullifying the right of cumulative voting, as illustrated
below.
The Montgomery Ward Company has a board of nine directors. There
are approximately six and one-half million shares outstanding. Assume
that five and one-half million votes will be cast, and of these the majority
has three million and the minority two and one-half million. By multiplica-
tion, the majority has twenty-seven million votes (9 x 3,000,000) and the
minority has twenty-two and one-half million votes, (9 x 2,500,000) respec-
tively. By the proper concentration of votes, the majority may elect five
directors and the minority four directors, leaving management control with
the majority. The minority, however, has substantial representation.
Majority slate Total votes
of directors A B C D E F G H 1 cast
Majority Votes Majority
(in millions) 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 27,000,000
Minority slate
of directors R S T U V W X Y Z
Minority votes Minority
(in millions) 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 22,500,000
Now assume the directors are divided into three classes, and at the time
of the election all nine directorships are held by the majority. Only three
directors are to be elected.' 8 Therefore, the number of votes to be cast
decreases. The majority will have nine million votes (3 x 3,000,000). The
minority will have seven and one-half million votes (3 x 2,500,000). Again
there is a proper concentration of votes, inasmuch as both the majority
and minority know they can not capture all three of the directorships.
14. FLA. STAT. c. 608 (1953).
15. In the absence of an express provision in the charter, a Florida corporation
stockholder would not have the cumulative voting right.
16. Note, 56 DICK. L. REV. 530 (1951).
17. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Tennessee.
18. ILL. CODE. ANN. § 157.35 (1951): Provided maximum of three classes of
directors to hold office for no longer than three years each.
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Majority slate Total votes
of directors A B C cast
Majority votes Majority
(in millions) 4.5 4.5 9,000,000
Minority slate
of directors k S Tr
Minority votes Minority
(in millions) 7.5 7,500,000
Here, even though cumulative voting is utilized, the best the minority
can do is to capture one directorship. 19  In succeeding years the result
would be the same, and the minority as such, could never capture more
than three seats in any three-year period. For, in the fourth year, the
director elected in the first year will have completed his term and would
be up for re-election. 0
In the instant case, the court believed the stagger system was contrary
to the purpose and intent of the Illinois Constitution which guarantees
the right to cumulative voting. The decision rested upon the court's
conclusion that by use of director classification, the cumulative voting
right was watered down to the point, that in reality, it was of no effect.
There is room for argument however, since cumulative voting is a guarantee
of minority representation on the board of directors and not necessarily
of "fair" representation. Even under the classification system, the minority
stockholders of the Montgomery Ward Company would have secured
at least one chair, if they were a sufficient minority. The decision was
solely one of constitutional interpretation.
Florida has a statute2'l providing for the classification of directors.
The same is true of I)elaware, 22 New York,23 New Jersey2- and Massa-
chusetts25 However, it is not likely that those states will be affected by
this decision as there exists no constitutional or statutory right to cumu-
lative voting 2a Other states, such as California,2 7 South Carolina,2
South Dakota,2U Ohio,30 Washington-' and Pennsylavnia 32 give the right
19. Id.
20. Under the Illinois law no more than three directorships could be acquired at
any election, and that would take almost a unanimous vote of the stockholders.
21. FLA. STAT. § 608.08 (1953).
22. 8 DEL. Cow:, ANN. § 141 (1953).
23. N. Y. LAws c. 717, § 6 (1951).
24. N.J. REv, STAT. 14: 7-3 (1937).
25. MASS, CEN. LAWS C. 156, § 22 (1932).
26, Inasmuch as some states do not require cumulative voting, it follows that there
should be no objection to a statute providing for classification of directors.
27. CAL. LAW OF CORP. C. 1, § 2235 (Deering 1947).
28. S.C. CONST. ART. IX, § 11 (1895); S.C. STAT. ANN. § 12-253 (1952).
29. S. DAK. CONsT. ART. XVII. § 5 (1898).
30. O1o STAT, ANN. § 1701.58 (1953).
31. Rrv. CoD, WAsh. 23:32:070 (1951).
32, PA. CONST. ART. XVI, § 4 (1874).
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to cumulative voting by constitutional or statutory provision. Of these,
only Ohio 3 and Pennsylvania 34 have statutes expressly authorizing director
classification. It seems that those states requiring cumulative voting
generally do not authorize the classification of directors. It is probable
therefore, that the laws of those states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania
which ensure the cumulative voting right and at the same time authorize
director classification may come under fire. The instant case may be
persuasive in those jurisdictions, but, in all probability, will have no effect
in jurisdictions without constitutional or statutory cumulative voting
requirements.
PA_. Low
33. OHIO STAT. ANN. § 1701.64 (1953).
34. 15 PA. STAT. § 48 (Purdon 1938).
